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Shari'ah and State Formation: Historical Perspective
Amira El-Azhary Sonbol*fl
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Islamic world, personal status laws concerned with marriage,
divorce, child custody, and other issues pertaining to family, stem from the
Islamic Shari'ah while other forms of law, like criminal or commercial codes, are
imported from Europe and, more specifically, from France.1 However, the
diffusion of law from one type of legal code to the other, specifically the impact
of Western codes on personal status laws in most Islamic countries, receives
little recognition. This is problematic for a number of reasons, the most
important of which is that as long as the laws guiding gender relations are
considered to be based purely on the Shari'ah-regarded as the word of God
based on the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions as interpreted by legitimate
Muslim clerics-it becomes almost impossible to change them.
Deconstructing the genesis of modern personal status and other legal
codes in Muslim countries is an essential first step in changing those codes
dealing with gender relations, and therefore women's rights, in Muslim countries
Professor of Islamic History, Law and Society, Georgetown University.
t This article is heavily dependent on archival records located at the National Archives of Egypt in
Cairo, Egypt and on Palestinian and Jordanian archives located at the University of Jordan in
Amman, Jordan. It should be noted that these records are extremely rich with material for the
study of the legal and social history of the Middle East and particularly for the study of family and
women's lives, two subjects that continue to be studied through discourses of religious luminaries.
VWhile permission is needed to use these records, permissions can be received by applying to the
authorities concerned. It is my hope that the material presented by this Article would encourage
greater use of these archives and others located elsewhere so we can continue to unlock the
realities of the past. The past determines our present and our future decisions and it is good to
base these decisions on concrete realities and experiences of peoples rather than moral judgments
of observers and thinkers notwithstanding how important both may be.
i Citations to archival cases were left in their original format. The Chicago Joumal of International Law
expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this Article's Arabic citations and references.
I al-Kitab al-Dhahabi l'il-Mahakim al-Ahliyya, 1883-1933 118, 124, 128 (Cairo: Matabi' al-Amiri)ya
1938).
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today. Studying the history of personal status codes currently applied in Muslim
countries reveals that these codes are the product of modern state committees'
selection and deliberation of nation-state building issues. This explains the
significant differences in particular laws and their application in various Muslim
countries, notwithstanding the claim that they are Shari'ah laws. Understanding
gender issues in religious dogma and looking at the historical role of the Shari'ah
could lead to greater freedoms and changes in gender roles and other forms of
laws pertaining to governance and citizenship.
Since these societies subscribe to discourses that rely on the Shari'ah as the
source of family law and gendered conduct, any approach to legal change that
does not take the Shari'ah as a starting point in Muslim societies has little
potential for success. Thus, at least as a first stage in the struggle for women's
rights, it is important to formulate strategies for success that take the Shari'ah
into consideration if prospective laws are to have any chance of passing male-
dominated legislatures and governments while gaining acceptance by the larger
population. A starting point is to conceptualize the discourse surrounding
Shari'ah not as the stagnant, unchanging, and unchangeable collection of laws
that its critics and conservative advocates make it out to be,2 but rather as a
venue for deliberation and designing laws that are preferable for society (istihbab
and istihsan). The very lens through which to consider what is preferable for
society should in itself provide an important prism for changing laws. What
should the primary goal of such deliberative discourse be? Is it the individual
good and hence rights that should be the primary goal? Is it the community at
large? Or is it what is "preferable to Islam," as advocates of rigid Shari'ah rules
insist? The fact that the Shari'ah has not been so rigidly understood in the past,
but rather was regarded and applied dynamically in courts provides a basis for
looking at the Shari'ah as a source of laws for the common good rather than a
rigid collection of laws. This flexible conception would enable all members of
society to participate dynamically in governance and decision-making. The
picture of a restricted Shari'ah that is interpreted and applied by a select few in a
narrowly defined way simply does not fit with legal history in different parts of
the Islamic world.
It is therefore imperative to challenge the perception of a non-changeable
Shari'ah. Examining legal practices over time is the best way of doing so in the
face of claims of absolute authority by conservative and fundamentalist
interpreters of Islamic law. In the following discussion, fqh (jurisprudence) will
be contrasted with practices in Shari'ah courts in an effort to illustrate the actual
2 See, for example, Leila Ahmed's seminal work on the impact of Islam on the life of women,
Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modem Debate (Yale 1993). See also Asma Barlas,
Beleving Women in Islam: Unreading Patarcbal Interpretations in the -Qur'an (Texas 2002).
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role played by fiqh in pre-modern Shari'ah courts. As this Article illustrates,
Shari'ah courts played a central role in the life of people and the relations
between them. Court records show us how societies existed, people interacted,
and women actually lived. My view of such records is that they are the product
of a living society rather than text to be analyzed solely for the words and
language used or particular law applied. Textual analysis offiqh and other sources
is at the heart of confining discourses that hang on to a word, symbol (such as
veiling, seclusion, obedience, and other words whose significance is interpreted
and generalized), or interpretation. Important questions to ask about Islamic law
should focus on actual legal practice and not solely on what religious thinkers
opined should be the practice. That is, the focus should be on how courts
applied the law: did they follow the writings of the fuqaha' or did they see the
writings of fuqaha' and muftis as part of the theologians' opinions or moral
agenda? These questions need to be addressed, particularly given the centrality
of theological interpretations to conservative laws and legal efforts to institute a
closed, conservative Shari'ah that requires women to stay in the home-leaving
only for specific purposes and with a husband's permission-and that limits
women's ability to work and to earn a living or receive an education. This is
particularly so given the fact that efforts to confine women's movements have
already succeeded in countries like Afghanistan and Iran where laws had been
interpreted differently before clerical takeover of the state. Today, there is an
international movement among Muslim radicals to push such a conservative
agenda forward.3
This Article focuses on issues of Islamic discrimination against women and
asks how centuries of legal practice in Shari'ah courts illustrate Muslim societies'
regard of the witness of women, women's work, women's seclusion, and the
existence of or the need for a private/public divide in a woman's role in society.
Furthermore, this Article explores the legal system when Shari'ah courts
practiced Shari'ah law before the coming of the West or the modernization of
law in Muslim countries. Were presumptions, such as the nature of women, at
the heart of the system, or were rules of evidence the determinants of justice?
How closely followed were the conclusions of jurists and mufti's (jurisconsults)
when it came to decisions made by qadis (judges)? Finally, how can we define
justice in Islamic courts? I deal with these questions through two main inquiries
using Shari'ah archival records from Egypt and Palestine during the Ottoman
period and into the nineteenth century. The first inquiry deals with the
public/private divide, which is the usual justification for giving less credibility to
3 Good examples here are the pronouncements of the Council of Senior Ulama of Saudi Arabia
and amendments to Hudood Ordinances being introduced by the government of Pakistan.
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the witness of women. The second inquiry will deal with archival evidence
regarding the witness of women including their role as expert witnesses.
II. FLEXIBILITY OF THE SHARI'AH AND ITS APPLICATION IN
SHARI'AH COURTS BEFORE THE INTRODUCTION OF
MODERN LEGAL CODES
In calling for a re-reading of theological interpretations, Mohammad Fadel
suggests a methodology that recognizes the tensions and problems "that have
long been recognized to exist within Islamic law."' He argues that
"jurisprudence, precisely because it takes a broader interpretive perspective,
allows for the possibility of a gender-neutral interpretation of female
participation in the law to emerge."' For example, when discussing women's
witness, which is widely regarded as evidence for Islam's discrimination against
women, Fadel explains that acceptable Muslim rules on the subject revolve
around the following Qur'anic imperative: ".... get two witnesses out of your
own men, and if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as
you choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them errs, the other can remind
her."6 Hadith interpretations' further emphasize and explain the deficiency in a
woman's witness as well as her inability to hold public office because of the
hadith narrative that al-nisa' naqisun "aqlan wa dinan ("women are deficient in mind
and religion"). Thus, the normative view of Islamic fqh is that a woman's
witness alone is not acceptable in court. It has to be corroborated by that of a
man and that the witness of one man is equal to two women. In other words,
the general rule is that courts should not accept the witness of one woman alone;
even if two women are witnesses to an event, they still need the corroboration of
a man.
Fadel's reading of theological interpretations diverges from this picture. He
sees tensions and nuances in Islamic legal scholarship that allow for the witness
of women without the corroboration of male witnesses, even among recognized
conservative medievalists like Ibn al-Qiyyam and Ibn Taymiyya, both of whom
allowed the witness of women in matters concerning feminine functions or the
4 Mohammad Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal
Thought, 29 IndJ of Middle E Studies 185, 200 (1997).
5 Id at 186.
6 Qur'an 2:282.
7 Hadith interpretation refers to commentaries on the sayings and actions of the Prophet
Muhammad. They are considered to be the second source of Islamic law by Sunni Muslims.
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household. In regard to public matters, Fadel finds that women's witness is
allowed when it concerns financial transactions.9 Fadel explains that thefuqaha's
considered women's witness to be limited because they were not permitted to
participate in the public sphere and social standards of public morality dictated
that women should be left at home to "avoid social corruption and disorder."'"
Accordingly, women could not be expected to have been witnesses to public
occurrences such as matters involving death, marriage, divorce, and financial
dealings. But a woman's witness could be acceptable when and if women were
assigned to investigate court matters like rape or forced abortion. Put differently,
Muslim theologians saw a public and private divide where public morality was
important for the good of the community and therefore required the seclusion
8 Fadel, 29 Intl J of Middle E Studies at 200 (cited in note 4) ("Both of these jurists urged that
judges be allowed to treat a woman's testimony in the same manner as a man's as long as the
judge found the woman's testimony to be probative.").
9 Id at 194. The issue of women's witness in regards to financial dealings is a subject of controversy
and reinterpretation. Fadel takes on this issue because of its centrality to rigid patriarchal forms of
interpretation of Islamic laws. Another scholar who takes the same approach is Sheikh Taha Jaber
al-Alwani.
Thus, the [Qu'ranic] verse indicates clearly that there are differences in the
ability of women to serve, under the prevailing social conditions, as competent
witnesses and givers of testimony in cases involving financial transactions. The
relevant wording implies, that in general, transactions were not often matters
of concern to women at that time. It also indicates that the actual witness
would be one woman, even though her testimony might require the support of
another woman who would "remind" her if necessary. Thus, one woman acts
as a guarantor for the accuracy of the other's testimony.
See Taha Jaber Al-Alwani, The Testimony of Women in Islamic Law, available online at
<http://www.alhewar.com/TahaTestimony.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007). The more usual
approach among Muslim scholars is to accept the premise that the witness of two women is equal
to that of one man but to try to justify such a demand by explanations that presume that there is
no connection between such a requirement and an unequal status of women in Islam. For
example, Hammuda Abdul Ati states that
In some instances of bearing witness to certain civil contracts, two men are
required or one man and two women. Again, this is no indication of the
woman being inferior to man. It is a measure of securing the rights of the
contracting parties, because woman as a rule, is not so experienced in practical
life as man. This lack of experience may cause a loss to any party in a given
contract. So the Law requires that at least two women should bear witness
with one man. if a woman of the witness forgets something, the other one
would remind her. Or if she makes an error, due to lack of experience, the
other would help to correct her. This is a precautionary measure to guarantee
honest transactions and proper dealings between people. In fact, it gives
woman a role to play in civil life and helps to establish justice. At any rate, lack
of experience in civil life does not necessarily mean that woman is inferior to
man in her status. Every human being lacks one thing or another, yet no one
questions their human status (Qur'an 2:282).
Hammuda Abdul-Ati, The Status of Woman in Islam, available online at <http://
www.unh.edu/msa/w-status.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
10 Fadel, 29 Intl J of Middle E Studies at 193 (cited in note 4).
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of women in their homes. This means that women's expertise was thought to be
relevant only to the domestic sphere because they had little access to other
information outside of the home.
How did courts deal with women's witness, and how significant are the
interpretations of theologians to the actual legal process and the life of women?
Today, conservative theologians advocating a fundamentalist interpretation of
Islamic law present themselves as sources for "what Islam is," while holding on
to Shari'ah law as a domain to be defined by them and, as Khaled Abou El Fadl
accuses, claiming to "speak in God's name."" Thefuqaba', or learned interpreters
of Islam, have actually taken over discussions of gender laws, and their
conservative interpretations today are being confused with the Shari'ah as a
system for reaching legal decisions pertinent to the life of Muslim communities.
It is important to ask whether the law practiced in Shari'ah courts before the
modernization of law was based on the findings offuqaha' and muftis or whether
the judiciary system was more independent. The judiciary may have looked upon
the decisions of muftis (jurisconsults whose opinions were sought in regards to
ambiguous questions of law) and theologians as guides to decision-making, but
did not consider them as holding any prior authority over the decisions of
judges. Emphasizing this point leads to the observation that the writings of
fuqaha' theologians, so heavily used by fundamentalists today, were regarded as
opinions or discourses rather than law and that the legal system had its own
source of legal precedent.
This is a complicated but important issue. Judges practicing in Shari'ah
courts in the Ottoman Empire-before modern state codification of law started
during the late nineteenth century--did not practice qadi (Shari'ah court judge)
justice as scholars unfamiliar with the Ottoman judiciary system have asserted. 2
At the same time, qadis did have important areas of interpretation and flexibility
in reaching judgments based on legal precedent, including traditions specific to
the place and particular madhhab (school of law) of the litigants and the qadi, as
well as to what the qadi himself considered to be preferable for the community.
It could be said that the legal system practiced in pre-modern courts in the
Islamic world was largely based on common law established through local
practices, choice of legal school, and qadi discretion. Hence, there were both
consistent judgments in particular courts during particular periods and
11 See generally Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authoriy and Women
(Oneworld 2001).
12 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (George Allen 1948) (Talcott Parsons,
trans).
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differences between courts of different towns of the same provinces within the
Ottoman Empire.
13
A. PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC
Shari'ah court records from Ottoman Egypt and Palestine suggest there
was no private/public divide similar to that being pushed by modern
conservatives. Litigation in court seemed to be a daily activity for men and
women, and there were no separate courts for the sexes. Women appeared in
court routinely to register real estate purchases, 4 sales 5 and rentals, 6 dispute
ownership of property, 7 register loans they made to others," deal in goods,' 9
contract their own marriage, 0 divorce,2' ask for alimony, report violence
13 Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari'ah Courts: A Historical and Methodologcal Discussion, 27 Fordham Intl
tJ 225, 225-53 (2003).
14 Nablus Shari'a Court, 1284 (1867), film 2, sijill 14:314; al-Quds Shari'a Court, 1033 (1623), 20-
107:98-2.
15 Nablus Shari'a Court, 1284 (1867), film 2, sijill 14:317.
16 Cairo, Bab al-Sha'riyya,1009 (1600), 599:231-884.
17 Alexandria Shari'a Court, 1074 (1663), 51:603-867; Jerusalem, 1068 (1657), videotape 31, sijill 156,
page 123, case no 5; Nablus Shari'a Court, 1266-76 (1850-1860), 2-12:173; Ballas 1279 (1862)
24:8-9.
18 Nablus Shari'a Court, 1285 (1868), film 2, sijill 15:78; Nablus Shari'a Court, 1284-85 (1866-1867),
2-15:183.
19 Alexandria, 1223 (1808), 116:s31-57.
20 Gami' al-Hakim, 966-67 (1558-59), 540:200-898.
The burma (previously married adult) woman Zainab daughter of 'Abdallah b.
'Abdallah al-Zabidiya married her betrothed La'di al-Maghribi al-Nabili. The
dowry (sadaq) was 4 gold Maghribi, of which she admitted receiving one dinar
and the rest delayed until death or divorce. She married herself and the
mentioned husband accepted for himself a legal acceptance (qubul shar'i). He
determined 4 silver nisfs as clothing allowance and she gave her legal
acceptance to that. He took upon himself (wa 'allaq laha 'alaybi) with his
acknowledgment that if ever he took another wife or took a concubine or
moved her from where she lives at present which is located in the Gura at the
Suwaiqi market without her permission and she proves all this or part of it and
she exempted him from one dinar of the rest of her dowry then she would be
divorced one divorce with which she owned herself. With this I, the
mentioned husband, permitted my mentioned wife to live in the mentioned
place as long as she remained married to me (fi 'ismath) a legal permission ....
21 Marriage and divorce fill Shari'ah court sijills. Most are formulaic but some are amusing and
provide a glance at spousal relations. See Manfalut, 1228 (1813), 5:45-160 ("The woman
'Aliyya ... asked her husband to divorce her in return for freeing him from the obligation of her
delayed dowry and on condition that she turn over to him the wool bedcover he gifted her with at
the time of their marriage consummation.... ."). A husband with feelings for the woman
divorcing him? While women were often represented by a male relative in court, they also
appeared in person as the above case attests. They came asking for divorce or for alimony and for
Summer 2007
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against them,23 ask for financial support from husbands,24 and demand child
custody" and financial support from husbands and ex-husbands. 26 They came to
put their property up as religious endowments (waqfi, be assigned as overseer
of waqfS,28 be recognized as heads of guilds,29 or answer to accusations brought
against them.3 ° While veiling the face is central to discourses of public/private
divide, it is significant that Ottoman courts required identification of litigants,
such that women were not veiled inside courts. For example, a contract of
marriage from sixteenth-century Cairo includes a description of the woman's
appearance in court to contract her marriage.31
However, veiling was not traditional in Muslim society; qadis often
discussed how to treat the witness of veiled women because it was not common
practice. These discussions show that veiled women were actually tribal women
who veiled while in town and away from their tribes. The court's concern was to
ensure that the person rendering witness or representing themselves in court was
the actual person. The concern of one thirteenth-century Syrian qadi was that
there was no way to determine whether the witnesses to the woman's identity
custody of their children. See, for example, Dishna Shari'a Court, 1908, 166:17-37; Manfalut,
1229 (1814), 5:69.
22 Alexandria Shari'a Court, 1074 (1663), 51:59-138; 1223 (1808), 116:45-76; 51:591-1370.
23 Alexandria, 957 (1550), 1:82-388.
The woman Fatima... claimed that her husband Abu al-Fadl... did not live
with her as married couples do and that he beat her on her head for no reason.
She also asked him to pay the remaining balance of her dowry... and for the
clothing allowance that he owes her.., when asked.., he confessed to the
money he owed but denied the beating. [The court] forced him to pay and he
was put in prison.
24 Jordan, al-Salt Shari'a Court, 1319 (1901, 6:13-1.
25 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 1068 (1657), videotape 31:sijill 155, 85, case no 3.
26 Misr, I'lamat, 1266 (1849), vol 23: 244 case no 651; Dishna, Ishhadat, 1283 (1866), 17:1-9, 3-15,
2-16, 3-25, 8-44.
27 Nablus Shari'a Court, 1276-77 (1861-62), 2-13:95-96.
28 Dumyat Shari'a Court, Ishhadat, 176:252-240.
29 Alexandria Shari'a Court, da'awi, 1285 (1867), 3:143-44, case no 167; al-Quds Shari'a Court, 972
(1564), 46:12-2; 939 (1532), 3:95-3.
30 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 1071 (1661), 151:603-1.
31 Cairo, Dar al-Watha'iq, Qusun, 991 (1583), 246:444-1264 ("his fianc6, the woman Shahiyya
daughter of Shihadha bin "Issa, the butcher; of her beauties are her fair coloring, round face,
wide-set eyebrows, medium in height .... ."). Another example comes from the Mediterranean
town of Dumyat. Here the woman's whole face was unveiled and her body could be discerned.
... the wife is the women Hikam. Her attractions include her fairness of color,
strong eyebrows, strong contrast between the whites and blacks of the eyes.
She has an Arab face with green tattoos, one on her lower lip and the others
on her cheeks. Graceful in face and tall in body ....
Cairo, Dar al-Watha'iq, Dumyat, 1011 (1603), 43:84-182.
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had in fact ever seen her face, so he raised this concern for court procedures
with other qadis.32 Qadis dealt with the veiling problem by depending on two
witnesses to identify the tribal woman in court.
It is curious that, while such discussions between judges exist and court
records illustrate clearly that women wore no veil and were often described in
some details by court clerks as a form of identity, discourse on the necessity of
veiling as an Islamic requirement continues to be so central to fundamentalists
today. The contradictions between discourses on veiling should give pause to
those struggling to change women's lives in this modern world. Bedouin
influence and traditions are selectively presented by fiqh sources to create a
conservative morality confining women today instead of recognizing dominant
legal practices reflecting the culture and traditions in the Muslim experience
among its larger populations. This is one area that needs greater attention from
researchers and activists alike.
As for leaving the home, litigation in court involved disputes between
spouses over the wife's shopping activity and the husband's wish to control such
activity.33 Sometimes it was the husband who indicated his desire to divorce,
without paying compensation, because his wife did not obey his wishes and left
the house to shop or for other reasons.34 In other cases, the wife refused to stay
with her husband because he stopped her from going out. Court cases refer to
wives' actions as a form of disobedience to their husbands' authority. As seen
from the aforementioned examples however, these cases are usually associated
with men who wanted their wives back and with women who refused to live
with husbands who did not let them out or would not give them financial
support because they did not obey their husbands' dictates. One can conclude
that women found it natural to go out and often broke their marriages rather
than be forced to stay home.
But did women work? Was it normal for them to leave home to perform
jobs or financial transactions? Women's activities within the home, like weaving
and manufacturing in certain parts of the Ottoman Empire, are well-studied.35
Recent archival research regarding the involvement of women in the
marketplace has been rich.36 In this respect, the types of cases courts heard
32 Ibn abi al-Damm, Kitab Adab al-Qada' al-Durrar al-ManzumatfilAqdiya wal-Hunmat 280-82 (Dar
al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1987).
33 Alexandria, Fatawi, 1305 (1881), 1:133.
34 Alexandria Shari'a Court, 1187 (1773) 95:14-20.
35 See generally Suraiya Faroqhi, Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands: 1480 to 1820 (Isis 1995).
36 See, for example, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Women and Men in Late Eighteenth-Centu Egypt
(Texas 1995); Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, Women ofJordan: Islam, Labor, and the Law (Syracuse 2003).
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ranged from women buying and selling property37 to women bringing disputes
and charges against other sellers in the marketplace.38 Some disputes include
quarrels, defamation, or actual physical attacks by women or against women by
other women39 or men. Often the accusation was against a man for usurping a
woman's spot in the marketplace or for not having paid for goods received.
These cases often involved a complaint of physical violence committed by a man
against a woman who was not related to him.' Witnesses, including both men
and women, were brought in front of the judge, and there is no indication from
the archives that the judges gave more credibility to a male witness than a female
witness. Court records also indicate that women worked as saleswomen,
vendors, beauticians, entertainers,41 and physicians.42 They owned mills, 43 fruit
orchards, olive orchards, and they produced and traded in olive oil' and
manufactured soap. Women often headed coffeehouses, and some even broke
into male-dominated businesses like bakeries45 and pawnshops.46 If Shari'ah
court records indicate anything, it is that women led active lives, and that
working outside the home was something usual.
B. WOMEN'S WITNESS
With respect to women as witnesses, do there always have to be two
women in place of one man? Are two women always equal to one man? Does a
man have to be a corroborative witness to the testimony of two women for their
witness to be acceptable in court?
There are two types of witnesses in Ottoman records. First, there is the
sbuhud (witnesses), which are a permanent fixture of the court. The shubud are
not related to litigants; they are not there to witness events outside the court, but
37 Bab al-Sha'iriyya Shari'a Court, 1005 (1596), 596:624-2211.
38 A1-Quds Shari'a Court, 1058 (1648), 28-141:15-2.
39 Egypt, Dumyat Shari'ah Court, 1011 (1602), 43:57-110. ("the woman Shattiyya... claimed that
the woman Ghazl... assailed her while she was walking on the road.., and defamed her by
calling her a prostitute and pimp ... and asked her to pay compensation for the harm that befell
her.... ".
40 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 1058 (1648), 28-141:15-2 ("...the named Ibrahim hit [her] with a stone
on the right cheek then pulled her from her hair and dragged her....").
41 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 972 (1564), 46:12-2; 939 (1532), 3:95-3; 1010 (1601), 83:156-6, 235-5; 937
(1530), 1:267-2.
42 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 972 (1564), 46:12-2.
43 Al-Salt Shari'a Court, 1320 (1902), 7:97-206.
44 Nablus Shari'a Court, 1266-76 (1850-1860), 2-12:199.
45 Al-Ya'qubi, 1 Nabiyat al-Quds, referring to records of al-Quds Shari'a Court, 974 (1566), 47:86-1;
976 (1568), 47:181-1; and 978 (1570), 53:667-2.
46 Jerusalem Shari'a Court, 1058 (1648), 28-140:332-5.
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rather to witness events taking place inside the court. They are paid by the court
to give witness to court transactions such as sales contracts, marriage, and
divorce. Shuhud are easy to identify because their names appear frequently in
particular court records and often in consecutive cases. Archival evidence
suggests that shuhud were all men who spent long hours in the court and were an
essential part of the court system. They can be described as modern certified
attorneys-at-law.
Aside from shuhud witnesses, there were also corroborating witnesses who
were brought in by litigants to testify to events. They were expected to tell the
truth and when they did not, they could be severely punished47 or, depending on
its nature, the case could be dismissed.48 Women could testify as corroborating
witnesses in this context.
Frequent cases brought by and against women involved violence leading to
abortion. Forced abortions brought heavy compensation to the party proving
harm, including the mother, father, and the family. As such, abortions involved a
financial dispute that had to be brought to court. A female witness was often
involved, sometimes as an eyewitness or as a court-appointed expert sent by the
judge to investigate the veracity of the accusation. Even though this involved a
financial matter, there did not seem to be a need for a female witness to be
corroborated by that of another woman and a man. The approach to witnessing
by pre-modern courts was quite intricate in cases that involved abortion because
abortion was considered a crime.
Forced abortion cases were also intricate because they often involved
commercial competition and financial issues such as the situation where two
women fight over a particular spot in the marketplace and one of them brings a
case alleging that the quarrel resulted in her abortion. The conceptions of justice
and gender at the time often implicated such laws and traditions as the blood-
price (diyya)-the price paid for shedding the blood of a person or of killing a
person. The amount paid out as compensation depended on whether a person
was killed, which would entail a full diyya, or whether the harm was to a part of
47 al-Zahid Shari'ah Court, 1008 (1599), 666:9-23. This is a case in which a woman daimed that a
man raped her but she could not present evidence to his act and the man was able to prove his
innocence. The court passed a judgment of ta'#r on the woman for bringing false claim. Ta'#r
involves physical punishment.
48 Jerusalem Shari'ah Court, tape 35, sijill 178, 26, no 1. This case shows the flexibility of the court.
The normative view of Islamic law as presented byfiqh is that the witness of a non-Muslim is
superseded by that of a Muslim. But in this case, the court accepted the testimony of the Christian
woman who was accused by a Muslim woman of attacking and beating her. The Muslim woman's
husband acted as a corroborative witness, but the judge asked the accusing party for other
witnesses who were neutral. The Muslim woman could not present any, so the court found for
the Christian woman and dismissed the case, asking the Muslim woman and her husband not to
obstruct or act against the Christian woman.
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the victim's body, such as the loss of a limb, an eye, or permanent disfigurement.
Compensation for the latter type of harm was a fraction of the full
compensation for the death of a person. Abortion involved killing a person and
therefore came with generous compensation. Any case involving the payment of
diyya was therefore dealt with as both a financial matter and a criminal matter. As
noted earlier, the witness of women in financial matters was unacceptable to the
general body of the fuqaha' as well as to proponents of modern conservative
discourses on women and Shari'ah. The witness of women in abortion cases,
which always involve the payment of diyya, is therefore a good test of how valid
fuqaha's arguments with regard to gender issues were to the legal process.
The first step in abortion cases was to prove that an abortion had in fact
taken place because quite often the abortion was faked. Interesting court drama
included the spectacle of a woman bringing in a piece of liver and claiming that
it was an aborted fetus. If not recognized immediately, the court turned to a
local midwife who would appear and identify the "fetus." The testimony of one
midwife seemed to be acceptable in such cases. 49 Since courts were usually
closely located and accessible, claimants often brought the fetus to court or the
court sent a midwife expert to investigate. During the Ottoman period, Egypt
had altogether thirty-six courts located all over the country. Attached to each
court were sub-courts whose records were included with the records of the main
court. In the latter case, the testimony of a single midwife was sufficient. This
was in contrast to rape cases, which also involved financial compensation, where
practice required two midwives to testify, usually the midwife that treated the
victim and another who was sent out by the court."0 When the midwife was
known to the court or could be vouched for by witnesses, her testimony was
allowed without corroboration from another woman or man. Experts were
treated similarly, regardless of gender. In a real estate dispute, for example, an
eighteenth-century Alexandrian court sent out the head of the builder's guild to
investigate property lines between two houses. It also sent out the town's chief
engineer to corroborate his findings.51 In other words, whether corroboration of
a witness would be required was left up to the judge and depended on the
particular case.
In addition to serving as experts, women also constituted a substantial
proportion of corroborative witnesses. They testified about many types of
disagreements, including quarrels in the marketplace, disputes over property,
buying and selling, and criminal cases that took place inside and outside the
home. When it comes to contracts of all types, however, men predominated
49 al-Bab al-'Ai Shari'a Court, 1152 (1602), 221:283-429.
50 Cairo, al-Bab al-'Ali Court (1152), 221:283429.
51 Alexandria Shari'a Court (1130), 65:104-198.
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perhaps because most contracts were only between men. In such transactions,
men seemed to be the only official witnesses in court records.
Even though women could serve as corroborative witnesses, the record is
inconclusive as to whether two female witnesses were required to equal one male
witness. In fact, one might conclude that the witness requirements varied
depending more on the particulars of the case than it did on the exact type of
dispute being reviewed by the court. Thus, quite often the qadi refused to accept
the witness of a woman or two women and asked for corroboration from a male
witness. Other times the witness of two women was considered sufficient. The
following description of a case illustrates this point.
More than twenty days ago, the deceased left her husband's house intending
to visit some of her relatives. She met with the woman... , one of the two
defendants and said to her 'you are gossiping about me.' She then attacked
her and called out to her paternal cousin... who attacked the deceased who
was three months pregnant. They threw her to the floor, sat on top of her
and beat her with their hands and [kicked] her with their feet as they
straddled her. This took place in the presence of the women ... who are
present in court [giving witness to the events]. [The deceased] then got up
and went to her husband's house where she died [from her injuries]. [The
defendants disputed the details]. They were asked to bring evidence [to their
story] but were unable to do so.5 2
So here, the court accepted the witness of two women against the
defendants, who could not produce their own witnesses. In crimes involving
violence and death, there was usually a diyya as discussed earlier. In this case the
court did not seem to need a male corroborative witness to support that of two
females.5 3 That the witnesses were not the defendants' associates added weight
to their testimony. The court seemed to be primarily interested in the truth and
determined the veracity of the witnesses before accepting his or her testimony.
Reasons for rejecting testimony included: when the testimony of a man or men
conflicted with the details of the case, when the testimony appeared to be clearly
biased, or when a character witness could not vouch for the testifying man. In a
late nineteenth century case from Alexandria, a husband asked the court to
return his wife to his obedience. His wife had walked out on their marriage and
refused to return to him. When the court approached her, she declared that her
52 Assiut al-Shar'iyya, Ahkam (1881), 19:31-55.
53 Another good example of a case where two women were witnesses to the death of a woman
following child-birth involved women morticians who wash bodies of the dead before burial.
Here they testified in court that the woman's body did not show any signs of trauma or violence
that could have led to her death. Being a matter concerning the female body, it was not expected
that a man would have been witness to the childbirth and therefore to the death, thus the court
accepted the witness of the women who were present when the drama occurred. Dumyat, 1195
(1780), 279:109-138.
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husband had insulted and divorced her in public, and threatened her with public
harm. She asked the court to stop him from harassing her and named two
witnesses to the insults, threats, and public divorce. The court delegated a court
clerk to find other witnesses to test the veracity of the two male witnesses the
wife named. The clerk returned to court without finding anyone to vouch for
them, and the court asked the wife to present other witnesses, which became
unnecessary because the couple had meanwhile reconciled. 5"
It was an open question whether a single woman's witness was acceptable.
Interestingly enough it was. In one case, a man brought suit in court against
other men for intruding on his home at night intending to rob it. They attacked
his son, hit him on the head with a metal blade, and killed him. When the
deceased's wife was brought to testify, she gave witness to what took place, but
added that she had been so shocked at the events that she could not swear the
defendants were the same men who attacked the house. Her testimony was
acceptable to the court against that of the father-in-law, who was considered not
to have been able to produce evidence of his allegations. The case was
dismissed. 5
III. THE STATE, MODERN JUSTICE, AND THE
CODIFICATION OF LAW
Given the evidence presented in the preceding section, it is ironic that with
the modernization of courts and legal codes, the appearance of women in court
decreases perceptibly. Except for poor women who could not afford legal
representation, women almost stopped appearing in court and left litigation to
lawyers. Compared to the modern state, with its codification of laws, centralized
courthouses, and representations by lawyers, access to the judicial system was
one of the strongest assets of the Ottoman Empire. Most importantly,
codification of law meant the state decided on the actual laws that would be
applied in court. These codes were formulated by committees of clergymen and
law graduates who received their degrees in European or European-style law
schools opened by newly modernized states.5 6 Since legal codes were adopted
from outside the Islamic world there were bound to be serious contradictions
with personal status laws that used the Shari'ah as its basis. Most Muslim
countries have adopted constitutions that invariably affirm the equal rights of all
54 Alexandria Shar'iyya 1899, 38 old:1-329.
55 Assiut al-Shar'iyya, Ahkarn 1298 (1881), 19:50-22.
56 See generally Anmira Sonbol, The New Mamluks ch 3 (Syracuse 2000); Philip Gallad, 4 Qamus al-
Idara wa'l-Qad 1954-55 (Alexandria: Matbaat al-Qamus 1895); Muhammad Abdu, 2 Tagrir Islab al-
Mahakim al-Shar'yya in Muhammad 'Imara, ed, al-Amal al-Kamila il-Imam Muhammad Abdu 217
(Cairo: al-Mu'assassa al-'Arabiyya li'Dirasa wal-Nashr 1980).
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citizens. These rights extend equal citizenship, education, and work rights, but
none have a clear definition of equal rights of women and men. At the same
time, most Muslim countries are signatories of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination ("CEDAW"), adopted in 1979 by
the UN General Assembly.57 At the time of adoption, many Muslim countries
added formal reservations for religious and social reasons, specifically with
respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.58
The specifics of these reservations differ from one country to the other.
The modernization of law also included the division of legal codes into national,
criminal, and commercial codes. It was the state that decided which venues
would be responsible for which codes. Various courts opened and changed
according to shifting governmental and social needs. For example, Egypt divided
its court system into national, mixed, Shari'ah, and milla (non-Muslim
community) during the 1870s and 1880s. National courts oversaw interests of
the state at large, and the laws applied in these courts were borrowed from
French law and precedents. Mixed courts oversaw the business of foreigners
living and doing business in Egypt. Judges from different European countries
presided over the trials and applied European legal codes and procedures. Milla
courts applied religious family laws to their various religious constituencies
throughout the Ottoman Empire, and Shari'ah courts did the same for the
Muslim population. Since the powers of church courts were limited during the
Ottoman period when Shari'ah courts were open to litigation by both Muslims
and non-Muslims, new religious Milla courts did not have legal precedents to all
the legal issues litigated before them. Therefore they resorted to applying
Shari'ah law when there was a gap in precedence. For example, the courts
applied Muslim inheritance laws to non-Muslims, resulting in inheritances that
gave non-Muslim males double the females' shares. Ironically, other Shari'ah
laws like divorce, which could have given non-Muslims flexibility and a way out
of unwanted marriages, were not acceptable to churches even though the same
churches accepted Islamic inheritance laws. In other words, when Shari'ah law
benefited men, for example when men inherited double the portion that women
inherited, the church found the law acceptable. But when the law reduced the
power of the church as it did when it came to divorce, the church refused to
allow the application of the Shari'ah.
The result was a gendered system that had severe repercussions on the lives
of women. It would be a mistake to imagine that this was an accident. Rather,
57 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (1979) 19 ILM 33 (1980).
58 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Reservations to CEDA ,
available online at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm> (visited on
Apr 21, 2007).
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the evolution of a gendered system was a result of the codification of the law,
the division of courts, and what can be referred to as the religionization of
family law (by which I mean that religion was recognized by the state as the
source for laws dealing with family). Modern Shari'ah and Milla courts became
responsible for family matters dealing with marriage, divorce, child custody,
inheritance, and awqaf (falling within the domain of religion).,9 The whole
structure was placed under the power of the u/ama and religious authorities when
the new modernized courts were created during the last two decades of the
twentieth century. Courts and law dealing with family were delegated to religious
authorities while criminal, national, and commercial issues were relegated to
secular lawyers and judges educated in modern secular schools. Even after states
moved to unify the legal systems into a single rather than multiple court system,
as happened in Egypt in 1952, the legal codes and the philosophies behind them
remained the same. Modern national courts were responsible for the issues of
the public sphere, including business and national issues, and laws dealing with
family issues were seen as strictly within the religious domain.
Looking back at the nineteenth century and the process by which this
situation was reached, one cannot help but see the period of the Ottoman
Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) as a focal point in the change of gender laws.
While the Tanzimat were intended to reform, reinvigorate, and modernize the
Ottoman Empire, which had become the "Sick Man of Europe," some of the
results, as indicated in this Article, worked against women. The Tanzimat were
the product of political and military pressure exerted by European states with an
eye to exploiting the resources of the Ottoman Empire. They pushed for liberal
and religious reforms as part of their discourse aimed at swaying critics at home
and abroad.
The Tanzimat would have a significant impact on both women and the
laws being formulated during the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire to
deal with the modern family. The economic interests of the Ottoman Empire
demanded that commercial and criminal codes governing internal affairs be
modeled after European laws. But minority communities refused to have their
millet powers over family matters taken away from them. The result was the
division of the law into what became secular codes and the religious codes that
were administered by churches and synagogues, hence the "religionization" of
family law, while other areas of law including criminal, commercial, and national
were placed under the secular realm. This put gender into the authoritative
domain of conservative theological interpretation, with moral discourses serving
59 2 AI-Majm'a al-rasmyya /YI-mahakim al-ahl~yya Wa'l-shar'!yya case no 5, 1939, 10 (al-Matba'a al-
Amiriyya 1937).
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as paramount determinants of the law rather than leaving matters related to
family within a larger common legal system.
The patriarchal order that ensued and continues until today is hegemonic.
On the one hand, "secular" codes based on European commercial, criminal, and
national law helped the elite rule the commercial classes in their capacities as
businessmen and professionals dealing in a Western-dominated economic and
cultural system. Citizenship rules placed the male at the center of the family;
hence it would be through him that women and children would receive their
rights to citizenship. On the other hand, personal status laws handling gender-
specific issues or family relations confined the social structure within the
parameters of patriarchal power. Some of the laws instituted during the
twentieth century illustrate this. It is important to recognize that the personal
status laws of today are the result of modern laws introduced by the modern
state. The outlook and parameters of these laws may stem from the Shari'ah, but
the formulation, codification, and laws themselves are, in part, borrowed from
European codes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But since it
is understood that these are religious laws, Muslim communities do not
differentiate between the codified laws, how they were formulated, and the
state's role in constructing them. The belief that personal status laws are
representative of Shari'ah law rather than the product of modernization makes it
extremely difficult to change Muslim personal status laws today.
When it comes to criminal law, rape cases were often reported in Ottoman
courts; women or their guardians sued rapists for compensation asking for
punishment commensurate with the crime. The approach of the qadi was to first
prove that a rape had taken place and then to determine what type of
compensation the victim sought. If the rape was proven, the perpetrator was
physically punished unless the victim withdrew her complaint or the perpetrator
paid the victim compensation equal to the sum of the victim's expected dowry.
If rape was not proven, the qadi had to decide whether this was a false
complaint-in which case the person bringing the complaint could be
punished°--or whether the case should be dismissed because it could not be
proven. The latter scenario seemed to happen often due to the fact that such
crimes usually take place away from the public eye. To prove rape, it was useful
to have the witness of a midwife who could testify that either she had treated the
victim or that the victim had been a virgin before the rape. The idea of the
culpability of the victim did not play a role in Ottoman courts. Without a
confession or witness, the case sometimes hinged on the moral standing of the
victim and the accused. Since the communities served by courts or sub-courts
were usually limited in size, the qadi could easily find out about the moral
60 Bab al-'Ali, 1034 (1624), 106:342-1229.
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standing of the parties and quite often litigants were required to present
character witnesses.
The following cases are presented here as examples to help illustrate the
handling of rape by pre-modern courts. In a case from nineteenth century Cairo,
a woman alleged that a man raped her at knife-point. She claimed that she had
been a virgin and demanded compensation for rape and loss of virginity. The
man denied her allegations and produced character witnesses and eyewitnesses
who presented testimony to the effect that they were sitting in front of his shop
at the time of the alleged rape and saw him in his shop at that time. Witnesses
also came forth to testify against the woman, suggesting that the victim was of
ill-repute. The qadi found against her and expelled her from the quarter of the
town where the drama unfolded.61
In another case involving a virgin, the midwife (daya) witnessed the fact
that the victim's hymen had been recently and violently broken. The court found
sufficient evidence that the rape had occurred and found for the victim, ordering
the rapist to pay her due compensation.62 In a third case, the victim was a
servant who claimed that her master raped her and got her pregnant. The man
denied the allegations, indicating he was a man of good standing who took care
of the mosque next to his home and opened it every dawn for prayers. The girl
was unable to present evidence supporting her allegation so the court dismissed
the case. However, the judge did not punish the girl. Since the Shari'ah required
the punishment of those who bring false accusations, the qadi's action in this
case indicated that he believed her story despite the fact that it was not proven in
court.63 In a fourth case, the victim managed to prove her case to the court and,
notwithstanding the man's denial, the court ordered him to pay compensation to
his victim and had him whipped as punishment for his crime.64 Another way
rape was handled was the victim and rapist could marry. Courts accepted this
resolution, although the victim had to withdraw her complaint before the court
dismissed the case. In one such case from Assiut, Egypt, a man raped a woman
who had refused to marry him. In court he declared his wish to marry her but
she refused to comply and demanded compensation and punishment through
ta'#,r (whipping or beating) for the rapist.65
How did things change with modern criminal codes? For one thing, law
categorized rape differently. Whereas the act of rape as forced sexual intercourse
on an unwilling victim was referred to by the term "rape" or the Arabic
61 Bab al-'Ali, 1031 (1621), 103:176-566, 17.
62 Alexandria al-Shar'iyya, Da'awai ,1285 (1868), 3:163-211.
63 Assiut Shari'ah Court, Ahkam, 1881, 19: 49-98.
64 al-Bab al-'Ali Shari'ah Court, 1044 (1634), 116: 216-1145.
65 Assiut Shari'ah Court, Ahkam, 1881, 19:69-139.
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"ighlisab," modern legal codes in Egypt used the term hatk 'ird, defined as any
offence involving immodest physical, mental, or emotional action that could
hurt a woman's modesty. Ighlisab is an ugly specific and focused word with little
ambiguity in meaning.66 Society uses ightisab to identify rape, but law uses it to
refer to illegal acquisition of property, real estate, money, or goods.67 By
describing the crime of rape as bark 'ird, the impact of the crime itself becomes
diluted. Furthermore, Egyptian law, Article 267 states: "Whoever has sexual
intercourse with a female against her will is to receive a permanent or limited
life-sentence. 68 In other words no specific punishment is identified for rape; the
sentencing is left to the discretion of the judge. This opens the door to leniency,
which has proven to be the case since Egyptian law also takes the demeanour
and morality of the victim into consideration. This is comparable to Jordanian
Article 292(i) of the penal code which defines rape and sets punishment of the
crime as "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a female (other than his wife)
without her willingness whether through the use of force or threat or deception
or trick will receive a temporary prison life-sentence, a period not less that ten
,,69years. Setting the punishment at a minimum prison sentence helps control
rape which reflects the comparative situation in Jordan and Egypt today. It is
also interesting, however, to note that forced sex with a wife is not considered
rape according to the Jordanian code, nor is incomplete rape considered rape
since actual intercourse did not take place.7° Furthermore, according to
Jordanian law any rape that does not involve vaginal intercourse is not
considered rape even if it involved another bodily orifice."
In regards to guardianship and the deterioration of women's custodial
rights, as court records demonstrate, judges granted women custody of their
children frequently, particularly when the husband was deceased.72 Modern
66 Ibrahim Saleh, Qanun al-'Uqubat. al-Mu'adal bi-qanun raqam 97 li-sanat 1992 190-92 (Cairo 1995).
67 See Article 325 of Egypt's penal code. Salih, Qanun al-"uqubat 216 (Cairo undated).
68 Saleh,Qanun at 190 (cited in note 66).
69 Ramzi Ahmed Madi, 2Qanoun al-'Uqubat raqam 16 isanat 1960 140 (Amman: Mktabat al-Thaqafa
wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi' 1998).
70 Mjallat Niqabat al-Muhamyin 711 (Amman: Niqabat al-Muhamiyyin 1966).
71 For a good discussion about this subject, see Kamil al-Sa'id, SharbQanun al-'Uqubat: al-Jara'im al-
Waqi'a 'ala al-Akhlaq wal-Adab al-'Ama wal-Usra 248 (Maktabat Dar al-Thaqafa lil-Nashr wal-
Tawzi' 1994).
72 See Amira Sonbol, Negofiaing and Diruting Marriage and Business in Eary Modem Egypt and Palestine
17 L'Homme: Europaische Zeitschrift fur Feministische Geschichtswissenschaft 37 (2006)
(dealing in detail with the issue of custody and presenting court case documentation). The
following is among the cases dealt with in this article:
The Qassam (judge in Qisma 'Askariyya courts that deal with inheritance),
may God bless him, assigned the woman Fatma... as guardian and spokes
person for her two sons, the infant Shams al-Din son of the deceased Mahfuz,
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personal status laws changed this with the state's selection of the Hanafi code as
the basis for guardianship of children, an area in which the Hanafi code is
particularly patriarchal and elitist.73
Previously, Egypt's courts applied the Shafi, Maliki, and Hanafi codes.
Litigants would select the code of their choice by selecting a judge from the
particular school to which they belonged or a judge from the school which was
favorable to their particular case. Modern Egyptian laws of guardianship
however follow the Hanafi code in a particular interpretation which gives the
mother little of the rights courts granted her before: "a mother has no right to
guardianship (wilaya) over person or money [meaning property] according to the
rule of law. But she could be selected as guardian (wasiyya) over money by the
father or the grandfather. ' 74 A 1974 custody case illustrates the significance of
the changes. A divorced mother asked the court for continued custody of her
daughter rather than granting custody to the father when the girl reached the
legal age for such a transfer. The mother based her argument on the
constitutional principle that Shari'ah was the principle source of Egypt's laws.
Accordingly, she asked that the Maliki madhhab be applied in her case rather than
the Hanafi madhhab since the constitution specified no particular madhhab but
only pointed to the Shari'ah as the source of personal status law. According to
the Maliki madhhab, a daughter could stay in her mother's custody until she was
married while the Hanafi madhhab demanded the girl be turned over to her father
at age nine." Because the constitution does not specify, a state's preference for
and the minor Muhammad Abul-Surur, orphan of the deceased Muhammad
Abul-Surur. She is to take care of them, make decisions on their behalf and
about them in regards to buying and selling, receiving and giving, cashing
[funds], spending [it], [handling] all legal matters and perform all functions
expected of a legal guardian according to the law and to do what is involved in
guardianship legally with good will and their [the children's] welfare, until they
each reach maturity to handle their religious duties and their money. This
decision was rendered in the presence of the paternal grandfather of the two
boys mentioned above and the khawaja (title given to an important merchant)
the honorable al-Zini "Abdal-Rahman... the merchant from the Ja'lun
market .... They accepted this [mother's guardianship] in the legal way and
the Qassam assigned the above-mentioned boys' grandfather, the khawaja
"Abdal-Rahman, as nazir (supervisor) and spokesman on behalf of the boys
over the guardian so that she cannot undertake any transactions without his
prior knowledge and discussing it with him.
Qisma "Arabiyya Court, 1013 (1604), 16:119-214.
73 For information about the application of Hanafi code in Egyptian courts and the education of law
students and judges in the Hanafi code, please see Philippe Gelat, II Rpertoire giniral annoti de la
lgislation et de l'administraion Egyptiennes: 1840-1908 256-379 (Alexandria: Impimerie J.C.
Lagoudakis 1908).
74 I AI-Kitab al-dhahabj /'il-mahakirn al-ahlivya, 1883-1933 234 (Al-Matba'a al-Amiriyya bi Bulaq 1937).
75 Muhammad al-Bakri, II Mawsu'at a/-Fiqh wal-qada'fill-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya 620-21 (Dar Mahmud
lii-Nashr wal-Tawzi" 1991).
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one madhhab would be contrary to the constitution as well as being
discriminatory against mothers. The judgment of the court went against the
mother and the case was dismissed on the ground that it was the "lawgiver's"'
(meaning the state or the ruler) prerogative to choose what madhhab to apply and
the lawgiver preferred the Hanafi madhhab. It was also the judge's opinion that
the lawgiver was justified in this because the state knew better the needs of
society, and the Hanafi madhhab was more suitable in regards to child custody.
While Malikis looked at an unmarried girl as inexperienced and in need of her
mother's guidance, Hanafis were concerned with her reaching puberty and
reaching sexual awareness which needed to be controlled and placed under male
protection.76
When it comes to citizenship, the applicable rule followed the European
precedent that a "woman follows the nationality of her husband." An example
of the impact of this rule comes from 1938 when Egypt's courts ruled on a
nafaqa (financial support) case brought by a wife against her husband from a
different religious denomination.77 The ruling differentiated between what the
judge referred to as jinsiyya siyasdyya (political nationality) and jinsyya ta'ifiyya
(sectarian nationality or religious affiliation). In this case, both the husband and
wife's political nationality was Egyptian even though the wife was Italian,
because the nationality principle stated that "a wife followed her husband's
nationality.' 78 Their sectarian nationality differed, however, because one was a
Catholic Copt and the other an Italian Catholic, and both sects were recognized
as separate churches by the Egyptian state. 79 As this case shows, the legal rights
of the man and woman belonged to their religious institutions, while the
woman's citizenship rights stemmed from her husband.
Where did the idea that "a wife followed her husband's nationality" come
from? The subject of nationality or citizenship does not make an appearance in
Ottoman courts or law before the nineteenth century. Rather it is closely
connected with the Tanzimat reforms and with developments in Europe where
states were defining their control over their populations following the
Napoleonic wars and the Peace of Vienna in 1815. Faced with problems
regarding non-Muslim citizens and privileges granted to Christian and foreign
76 Id at 616-28.
77 For a general discussion of this case and others see, Amira Sonbol, Questioning Exceptionalism:
Islamic Law, 6 Arab Stud J 76 (1998).
78 9 MahkamatAskandaiyya al-Iblida'yya al-Shar'iyya, case no 25, year 39, 56-58 (Sept 4, 1938).
79 Id. The different jinsiyya ta'ifiyya recognized by the government of Egypt were Orthodox Copts,
Armenians and Greek, as well as various Catholic and Protestant groups, each of which had its
own majlis milli. The specific case was adjudicated by the Alexandria Court of First Instance on
September 4, 1938 and was published in al-Majm'a al-Rasmiyya l'il-Mabakim al-Ahliyya wa'l-Sbar'yya
56 (a-Matba'a al-Amiriyya 1939).
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subjects through concessions enjoyed by foreigners in the Ottoman Empire
since the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire sought to control the abuse of
these concessions by passing a law in 1869. This law was a compromise between
Ottoman concerns and the demands of European powers of the nineteenth
century, particularly Britain and France, who were extending their power over
the world. Laws of nationality accepted elsewhere were to be applied in the
Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, Ottoman women who married foreign men lost
their Ottoman nationality and took that of the husband. They could enjoy
expatriate capitulatory privileges, including not being judged by national courts,
and privileges of free-trade forced on the Ottoman Empire by the European
powers at that time. These free-trade privileges included low taxation on imports
(which gave foreign communities an edge in commercial transactions), the right
to be judged by consular courts or mixed Courts, and judgment according to
European courts rather than national courts. Following a husband's nationality
meant that an Ottoman woman who married a foreign man took his citizenship
and could enjoy the extra-territorial privileges.
Notwithstanding its original intent, the law stating that a wife follows the
nationality of her husband has had unforeseen, far-reaching repercussions to the
present day. While the laws have been changed to allow women to keep the
citizenship to which they were born, they can not extend that citizenship to their
foreign husbands or their children from foreign men. As for men, their wives
and children receive citizenship upon request. This follows Shari'ah law, which
recognizes children as belonging to the father, though the very issues of
nationality and citizenship belong to the history of nation-states and have little
to do with theological writing, scripture, or pre-modern legal systems. The
problem of citizenship becomes critical given the movement of populations
between various countries today and intermarriages between groups such as
Palestinians and Jordanians. Children and husbands of Jordanian wives are given
no right of citizenship inside Jordan even though they would otherwise have
refugee status."
Defining a woman through her husband rather than as an indivividual was
part of the new patriarchal structure placing women under the umbrella of her
husband. She, in turn, owed obedience. He could divorce her at will, but she
could not divorce him without his prior approval unless she could prove
physical abuse, lack of support, or impotence. Giving the husband control over
divorce has to be seen as one of the biggest losses to women's rights during the
modern period. It has limited the ability of women to maneuver within the
marriage, to demand respect from her husband, and to hold on to her financial
80 For an expanded discussion of Jordanian-Palestinian nationality issues, see Sonbol, 27 Fordham
Intl LJ at 225-53 (cited in note 13).
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rights and custodial rights, which she almost always had to give up to the
husband in return for a divorce.
Women did not have equal rights to divorce before the modernization of
law; men always had the ability to divorce at will and women had to go through
the courts. But before the modernization of law, women were able to obtain a
divorce through khul', or repudiation, by which the wife returned the dowry she
received from her husband in exchange for a divorce. Neither the judge nor the
husband had the right to force a wife to stay in a marriage in which she refused
to stay. Modern law closed that door and added a new twist to the concept of
obedience (ta'a) by which courts could force an unwilling wife to return to live
with her husband.
While obedience was always a principle of Muslim marriages, it was
regarded as the wife's submissive act in return for financial support by her
husband.81 He could withhold this support if she was not obedient, but he could
not force her to live with him and neither could the courts. The courts
negotiated the financial settlement with or without the husband's prior
agreement. The difference was dramatic particularly since ta'a also meant being
incarcerated with a hated husband who could also be abusive or whom the wife
feared in a bayt al-ta'a or a house of obedience where the women was kept by her
husband until she agreed to return to the marriage fully. The system is described
as stemming from Shari'ah law, but in fact such institutions as bayt al-ta'a did not
exist before the end of the nineteenth century. 2 The only such precedents to be
found in British courts were the laws of coverture,"3 still applied in the
nineteenth century, and the practice of incarcerating women who rebelled
against their husbands until they resumed marital relations with their husbands.
81 The connection between financial support (nafaqa) and the wife's obedience is central to the
Muslim marriage contract and is a general topic covered by literature dealing with the subject of
the Muslim family. See, for example, John Esposito, Women in Muslim Famiy Law 26 (Syracuse
1982).
82 Amira Sonbol, Ta'a and Modem Reforms, 9 J Islam and Chisian-Muslim Relations 285 (1998).
83 Couverture was defined by John Stuart Mill in the following way "marriage relation as constituted
by law.., confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power [and] control over the
person, property, and freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and
will." See Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895 3
(Princeton 1989).
Summer 2007
Sonbol
Chicago Journal of Internaional Law
IV. CHANGING PERSONAL STATUS LAWS
On January 2000, the Egyptian parliament passed a new khul' law that
allowed women to obtain a divorce three months after asking the court for a
khul' divorce. During these three months, the court was supposed to attempt to
reconcile the couple. Ultimately, the law mandated that the judge grant the
divorce if the wife insisted. In return, the wife was to return the dowry she had
received at the time of the marriage. This revolutionary law was couched in
terms of expediting divorce procedures to end the thousands of accumulated
cases that courts were unable to handle. While the law was hailed as a great
success by feminists and attacked as an aberration of Islam by its opponents, in
actuality it did no more than reinstate the way the courts handled khul' cases
before the modernization of law: giving women the right to divorce in return for
the paid dowry. To argue for the law, activists used hadith literature as supporting
evidence to this interpretation of khul'.
Three years later, in October 2003, Morocco passed a new family law, the
Moudawana, with unanimous approval of the Moroccan Parliament and the
support of its King. The law's dramatic changes included equality of husband
and wife in regards to family responsibility and child custody. It raised the
minimum age of marriage for women from fifteen to eighteen years, made
divorce an act requiring mutual consent, and imposed limits on polygamy. While
opponents to the law declared it un-Islamic, feminists had demanded much
greater changes. Importantly, the reinterpretation of the Shari'ah based on the
Maliki madhhab made the changes to family law easier to pass and more readily
accepted. But when Jordan tried to introduce similar laws during the last few
years, it failed. During summer when the Jordanian parliament was in recess, the
government passed a khul' law allowing women to divorce within one month
after applying for divorce and closing legal gaps that had allowed reduced
sentencing for perpetrators of honor crimes. Once parliament came back from
recess, however, it canceled the laws that the government had passed.84
84 Reem M. Abu Hassan, Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Afnica: Cit ienship and Justice:
Country Reports: Jordan (Freedom House 2004), available online at
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=174> (visited Apr 21, 2007)
Despite the challenges to the advancement of women's rights, the Jordanian
government has taken steps to update Jordan's laws and bring them in line
with international standards. From 2001 to 2003, after the king dissolved the
parliament and much of the government, King Abdullah and the Council of
Ministers issued a number of provisional laws that promoted women's rights.
These provisions included amendments to the Personal Status Law (No. 82 of
2001), the criminal code (No. 86 of 2001), the Civil Status Law (No. 9 of
2001), and the Provisional Passport Law (No. 5 of 2003). Nevertheless, when
the House of Representatives came back into session in the summer of 2003,
it rejected many of the provisional laws.
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Tribalism and traditions as well as an outcry that these laws interfered with the
Shari'ah were at the heart of the conservative parliament's actions. Ironically,
while Jordanian laws allow women to include a condition that their husband not
take a second wife in their marriage contracts, Egypt's parliament refused to pass
such a law claiming it was against the Shari'ah.
V. CONCLUSION
The Shari'ah has historically been a dynamic source for the formulation of
law. Legal practices changed as part of the historical process and there were
always differences between the moral discourses of theologians and the actual
practice of deciding legal issues in courts where the ultimate interest was
negotiating disputes and arriving at the truth. Today, reform of gender laws in
Islamic countries has become a necessity given new conditions: a global world
with a global economy, technology and media, citizenship problems, poverty and
the movement of populations, goods and knowledge. For Muslims, Islam
continues to be the source they look to in conducting their moral life and human
relations. Bypassing Islamic discourses while writing laws makes such laws open
to reversal. By immersion in legal discourses about the Shari'ah, by illustrating
the genesis of contemporary personal status laws as the product of the diffusion
of laws from various sources including but not exclusively Islam, and by
illustrating the dynamic possibilities of the Shari'ah, women's groups and state
reforms in various Muslim countries have brought about critical changes in the
law. It is important that these efforts continue, and that past and present
interpretations of the Shari'ah continue to be widely discussed between multiple
groups outside of the confines of those who claim its nature as being exclusively
religious.
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